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Lawyers and the Practice of
Law in England: One American
Visitor's Observations, Part II
!1. Discovery and the Recovery of Counsel Fees in England:
A Model for American Reform?
The first part of this series, which appeared in the last issue of The Interna-
tional Lawyer, discussed certain features of the English legal profession. It
concluded that the English emphasis on practical training before admission
to practice and the high ethical standards observed by British advocates could
be instructive examples for proposed reforms in American legal education
and the conduct of American litigation.
This installment will review the English rules governing discovery and the
recovery of counsel fees in litigation and will contrast those rules with Ameri-
can federal practice. As with legal education and litigation ethics, the English
experience supports current American proposals to limit the scope of federal
discovery and permit prevailing litigants to recover their attorneys' fees. The
English experience shows that such reforms could resolve cases more quickly,
discourage frivolous or oppressive litigation tactics, and permit more com-
plete compensation for those litigants with meritorious claims.
A. Discovery
Discovery in High Court actions in England is considerably more limited
than discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under English
practice, discovery by right consists of an exchange between the parties of
relevant documents and requests for admissions. Each party must list the
documents in its possession, custody or control "relating to any matter in
question between [the parties] in the action," and it must afford the other
parties an opportunity to inspect all such documents except those considered
*Mr. Wilmarth practices law in Washington, D.C.
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privileged.' Each party may also request other parties to admit, prior to trial,
specified facts and the authenticity of particular documents.'
English rules do not provide for further discovery by right, and the permis-
sible scope of discovery is more restricted than under the Federal Rules. In
England, parties may obtain discovery only as to those unprivileged matters
which relate "to any matter in question between them in the action." 4 In
contrast, Federal Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of any unprivileged matter
"which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."'
Consistent with the spirit of the English rule, the Special Committee for the
Study of Discovery Abuse of the American Bar Association's Section of
Litigation (hereafter the "Special Committee") proposed in 1977 that the
scope of Federal Rule 26(b)(1) be narrowed to permit discovery only of mat-
ters relevant to "issues raised by the claims or defenses" of the parties.'
However, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Committee on Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (hereafter
the "Advisory Committee") rejected the Special Committee's proposal.7
In addition to imposing a stricter test of relevancy, English practice usually
does not permit pretrial discovery from nonparty witnesses. A party cannot
require a nonparty witness to give testimony or produce documents before
trial unless the witness would be unavailable at the time of trial, or unless the
witness was involved in the transaction which caused injury to the party and
'RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, [hereinafter cited as R.S.C.] Order 24, Rules 1, 2, 5 & 9, &
Note 24/5/5, reprinted in I SUPREME COURT P'RACTICE 401-17, 423 (1.H. Jacob ed. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as PRACTICE]. No discovery of 'documents is required of a defendant in a motor
vehicle collision case unless the Court otherwise orders. R.S.C. Order 24, rule 2(2), reprinted in
PRACTICE, supra, at 403.
'R.S.C. Order 27, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 456-60.
'R.S.C. Order 24, Rule 2, & Note 24/2/4, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note l, at 403-06.
'The English rules and the Federal Rules are similar in that they both permit parties to discover
information within the defined scope of relevancy which is not admissible at trial, so long as such
information is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. See Note 24/2/
4, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 405-06; FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (1).
'ABA COMMITTEE ON DISCOVERY ABUSE, THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE (rev. ed.
Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited aSTHE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE], summarized in 3 LITI-
GATION NEWS, No. 2 at 1, 7 (1978).
'The Advisory Committee's Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (February 1979), 80 F.R.D. 323. In its Preliminary Draft (March
1978), 77 F.R.D. 613, 626-28, the Advisory Committee disagreed with the Special Committee's
proposal to limit discovery to matters relevant to the "issues raised by the claims or defenses" of
the parties, because the Advisory Committee felt that an attempt to define relevancy based upon
"issues" would lead to the same problems which have been encountered in attempting to define
the present "subject matter" requirement. However, the Advisory Committee did recommend
that FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) be amended to limit the scope of discovery to matters relevant to
"the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party."
But in its Revised Preliminary Draft, the Advisory Committee dropped its proposal to amend
Rule 26(b)(1) to limit the scope of discovery. In an apparent change of heart, the Advisory
Committee stated that "abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general
as to require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases." See 80 F. R. D. at
330, 332.
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can give evidence which would identify the person(s) responsible for the in-
jury.'
Any discovery in England beyond the discovery of documents and requests
for admissions from other parties requires an order of the court. A party may
serve interrogatories on another party only with leave of the court, and the
court may approve only those interrogatories which "it considers necessary
either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs." 9 Thus,
the English rule is far more stringent than Federal Rule 33, which permits
each party to serve unlimited interrogatories without leave of the court, sub-
ject only to the court's power to issue a protective order under Federal Rule
26(c).
The Special Committee recommended to the Advisory Committee that
Federal Rule 33 be narrowed to permit each party to serve only thirty interro-
gatories without leave of court.'" The Advisory Committee, however, re-
jected this recommendation," even though the Special Committee reported
that "[no single rule was perceived by the [American] Bar at large respond-
ing to the Committee's questionnaire as engendering more discovery abuse
than Rule 33 on interrogatories."' 2
As with interrogatories, a party to an action in the High Court may not
depose another person before trial without a court order. While the court
may grant such an order "where it appears necessary for the purposes of
justice", the court will usually permit a deposition only where the prospective
witness is unable or likely to be unable to attend the trial because of poor
health or absence from the jurisdiction.'I Thus, the English rule regarding
depositions is.far more limited than Federal Rule 30, which permits unlimited
depositions by right, subject to any protective order entered under Rule 26(c).
In England, a party must apply to the court for permission to introduce
expert evidence at trial unless he obtains the consent of all other parties.
However, except in actions involving injuries or motor vehicle accidents,"'
'See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Comm'rs, [19741 A.C. 133. Document
discovery may also be obtained against nonparty witnesses in personal injury actions under the
Administration of Justice Act, 1970, 32(l).
'R.S.C. Order 26, rule I, & Notes 26/I/1-26/I/18, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at
443-5I.
"See THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 11-12.
"In its Preliminary Draft, 77 F.R.D. at 645-49, the Advisory Committee proposed an amend-
ment to Rule 33 which would permit the majority of judges in any federal district court to limit
the number of interrogatories which could be served by right by parties to actions in that court.
This proposal was based upon the Advisory Committee's judgment that each district court
should be permitted to decide whether to limit the use of interrogatories based upon "the
generality of its business and the habits of its Bar," a judgment that appeared to conflict with one
of the guiding purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, to promote uniformity
of practice and procedure among the district courts. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965). In its Revised Preliminary Draft, 80 F.R.D. at 340-41, the Advisory Committee did not
propose any limitation on the use of interrogatories by right.
"See THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 12.
'
3R.S.C. Order 39, Rule I & Note 39/l/3, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 629.
"The High Court will generally order pretrial disclosure of medical expert evidence in per-
sonal injury cases and of expert evidence regarding motor vehicles in collision cases.
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pretrial disclosure of expert evidence to other parties is not required unless
the court is "satisfied that it is desirable to do so." 5 Thus, in most cases the
court has discretion whether to order pretrial disclosure of expert evidence.
The English rule is, once again, more limited than the Federal Rule' 6 , which
requires that the parties respond to appropriate interrogatories by identifying
each expert whom they expect to call as a witness at trial and by disclosing the
subject matter on which the expert will testify as well as the substance of his
opinions.
Barristers and litigation solicitors believe that English discovery rules are
liberal enough to permit adequate if not extensive pretrial preparation, and
they and English judges alike criticize the sweeping discovery procedures
permitted by the Federal Rules on the grounds that such procedures lead to
oppressive "fishing expeditions" and delaying tactics.'" Taken together with
the growing evidence that our federal discovery rules permit delays which can
obstruct the fair resolution of meritorious claims, the success of the limited
English discovery rules supports the Special Committee's proposals to re-
strict the scope of discovery and limit the use of interrogatories.
The Special Committee's recommendations represent a constructive effort
to remedy discovery abuses which, many American litigators believe, are
caused by overly liberal discovery rules. The Advisory Committee's rejection
of these recommendations is hard to justify, and it is not surprising that
prominent American litigators have criticized the Advisory Committee's re-
fusal to adopt the Special Committee's recommendations.' 8
B. Recovery of Counsel Fees in Litigation
As with discovery rules, the English rules governing the recovery of counsel
fees differ considerably from American practice. Under the American rule
governing federal litigation, as reaffirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, " the prevailing
party in a case may not recover its attorneys' fees from the losing party unless
such recovery is specifically authorized by federal statute (or state law if the
case is one arising under federal diversity jurisdiction)" or by the court's
equitable powers in certain limited situations (for example, where the prevail-
"For the rules governing disclosure of expert evidence, see R.S.C. Order 38, rules 35-40,
reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 621-27.
'"FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)
"See Collins, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence for Use in Litigation in
the United States, : in England 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979); Leonard, Reducing Discovery Costs:
The English Experience, 5 LITIGATION No. 3 at 3-4, 54-56 (1979); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R.434, 450,452-55 (Dilhorne, J.), RadioCorp. of Am.
v. Rauland Corp., [19561 I Q.B. 618, 649 (Goddard, C.J.).
"See Lundquist, Chairman's Corner, 4 LITIGATION NEWS No. 4 at 2 (1978); Umin, Discovery
Reform: A New Era or Business as Usual?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1050 (1979). Mr. Lundquist was the
1978-1979 Chairman of the ABA Section of Litigation. Mr. Umin is a member of the Special
Committee.
1"421 U.S. 240 (1975).
"For an analysis of rules and statutes in certain states which permit recovery of counsel fees by
prevailing litigants, see Wills & Gold, Attorney's Fees in Litigation: Tine to Discard the A neri-
can Rule?, 4 LITIGATION No. 3 at 31, 32 (1978).
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ing party acts to vindicate a right or to preserve or recover a fund for the
benefit of others as well as itself, or where the losing party willfully disobeys a
court order or acts in bad faith or maliciously). In contrast, the prevailing
party in English litigation normally recovers its counsel fees (that is, the fees
charged by both its solicitor and barrister) together with the other costs which
it incurred in the action. Customarily, after the completion of litigation a
separate hearing is held before a "taxing Master" to assess the counsel fees
and costs which the losing party is required to pay to the prevailing party,
although this procedure of "taxing" costs can be avoided if the parties agree
on the amount to be paid. 2'
The successful party in a High Court action usually does not recover all of
its counsel fees and costs. In most cases, it receives costs and fees on a "party
and party" basis.22 Where costs and fees are awarded on this basis, the allow-
able fees for each piece of work by a solicitor or barrister are prescribed by
rule, so that "party and party" taxation permits the prevailing party to re-
cover only about seventy percent of its actual fees and costs.
However, the High Court has discretion in certain cases to order that fees
and costs be awarded to the successful litigant on a "common fund" basis, in
which case the litigant will recover virtually all of its counsel fees and ex-
penses. Generally, costs are awarded on a common fund basis only where the
losing party failed to comply with an order of the court, acted in bad faith, or
pursued a frivolous claim or defense.23
The above rules do not apply where a party (a) is guilty of misconduct or
neglect which increases the costs of litigation, (b) refuses or neglects to admit
facts or the genuineness of documents, and another party succeeds in proving
such facts or verifying such documents, or (c) amends a pleading without
leave of court. In such cases the court will order that party, whether it prevails
on the merits or not, to reimburse the other parties for the counsel fees and
costs incurred by them as a result of its default or amendment.24
The most important exception to the English rule regarding litigation costs
is that a party defending a claim may limit its liability for counsel fees and
costs by making a "payment into court" (in other words, an offer of judg-
ment) in respect of the claim against it. After the defending party has made
such a payment, the claiming party must either accept or reject it. If the
claiming party accepts the payment, the case is settled, and the claiming party
usually will recover its counsel fees and costs up to the date of the payment
into court. However, if the claiming party rejects the payment and ultimately
recovers a principal amount equal to or less than the payment sum, the claim-
"See generall' R.S.C. Order 62, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 925-1069, which
derives its authority from the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. See
also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
"R.S.C. Order 62, rule 28(2), reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 1003.
"R.S.C. Order 62, rules 28(3) & 28(4), reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 1003.
"R.S.C. Order 62, rules 3 & 7, reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 959-61, 969-70.
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ing party normally will not recover its counsel fees and costs incurred after
the date of the payment and will be required to reimburse the defending party
for the latter's counsel fees and costs from such date.
25
The payment into court technique provides considerable settlement lever-
age. A party defending a claim can make a payment into court for an amount
less than the full claim. The claiming party is thereby forced to choose either
to accept the lesser amount in satisfaction of its claim or to run the risk that it
will recover no more than the payment sum at trial and will then be required
to bear both its and the defending party's counsel fees and costs after the
payment date. Therefore, the payment into court rules undoubtedly account
in substantial part for the high percentage of settlements in English litiga-
tion. 26
The English rules regarding recovery of counsel fees and payment into
court have stirred considerable debate in this country. Some argue that such
rules should be adopted here because they would tend to discourage frivolous
claims, encourage fair settlements, and give fuller compensation to success-
ful parties. Others contend that the English rules would discourage bonafide
claims and particularly public interest suits by making the risks of litigation
too great for the claimant of limited means and by pressuring such a claimant
to settle its case for less than its true value.
27
My own view is that the English rules deserve serious consideration. Their
adoption here could contribute significantly to an easing of crowded dockets
and a more equitable litigation process by discouraging frivolous and harass-
ing claims, encouraging settlement of contested claims, and providing more
complete compensation for meritorious claims. One further point worth not-
ing is that adoption of the English practice, which permits the successful
party to recover its counsel fees and other costs, could provide a basis for
ending the controversial American practice of contingent fees, which are not
permitted in England. 8
"R.S.C. Order 22 & Order 62, rule 5(b), reprinted in PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 368-89, 966;
Hultquist v. Universal Pattern and Precision Engineering Co., [1960] 2 Q.B. 467; Findlay v.
Railway Executive, [1950] 2 All E.R. 969. Actually, the English rules on payment into court
operate in a way similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 68. However, Rule 68 is limited to recovery of
"costs," and, with the exceptions noted, see Part I1, in the text at pp. 174-5, the recovery of
"costs" does not include the recovery of attorney's fees. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970). Thus, it appears that in most cases Rule 68 would not permit a party
making an offer of judgment to recover attorney's fees as part of the "costs" granted under the
Rule.
"See Webster, The Bar of England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future, in LEGAL INSTITU-
TIONs TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 84, 97-99 (H.W. Jones ed. 1977)
'Compare, e.g., Wills & Gold, supra note 20 (in favor of the English rules), with Williams,
Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A. B.A.J. 859 (1978) (criticizing the English rules).
See also the articles referred to in Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 386 U.S.
714, 717 n.10 (1967).
"Webster, supra note 26, at 97-98.
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C. Conclusion
The English rules governing discovery and the recovery of counsel fees
differ considerably from American litigation practice. This contrast is in-
structive, for English advocates have learned both to make do with consider-
ably less discovery than American litigators are used to, and to prosecute
claims with the recognition that counsel fee awards hang in the balance. The
English rules evidently result in more settlements, fewer trials, less crowded
dockets, fewer delays, and less procedural harassment. In view of these ap-
parent benefits of English practice, the American Bench and Bar should
consider carefully the proposals currently being made in this country to limit
discovery and permit the recovery of counsel fees in litigation.

